MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers

SUBJECT : Interim Report on Analyst Training

25X1

The attached report on analyst training was prepared under contract by [redacted]. They recommend an expanded curriculum of training for intelligence analysts and offer a statement of philosophy regarding analyst training which may be of interest to you and your organization. The Director of Training's views are in the covering memorandum. I will be interested in any comments that you might have regarding this paper.

Harold L. Brownman
Deputy Director
for
Management and Services

Attachment

cc: DCI, w/att.
DDCI, w/att.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/
Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

6/21/74
Date

Distribution:
1 - Adse, w/att.
1 - DCI, w/att.
1 - DDCI, w/att.
2 - DD/M&S, w/att.
2 - DTR, wo/att.
2 - PDS, wo/att. (1 w/held)

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4 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Training for Analysis in C.I.A.

FROM [redacted] 25X1

1. Here is an interim report on our study of ways to improve the training of analysts.

2. American Intelligence, particularly CIA, has for nearly thirty years been adapting its functions and activities to a bewildering succession of changes in the world situation. It is our view that, complex and often successful as it has been, our experience over the past generation is not sufficient to prepare us to deal properly with the problems of the next. Changes in the world situation are now coming so thick and fast, are so unlike those we gradually grew familiar with, are so much more complex than the old black-and-white simplicities of Cold War and military threat, and reveal so many dangers to civilized concepts of world order, that we must learn to anticipate and analyze problems that were scarcely imagined even five years ago.

3. The need for us to develop the capacity to meet future demand has become painfully apparent in the world-wide energy crisis. For years CIA had been coming to focus upon that problem, but did not give it the broad urgent attention it came to require. We did indeed study world-wide petroleum reserves and production, but we scanted attention to such subjects as future pricing and distribution, future production capacity to meet growing demand, impact upon agriculture, and diplomatic and economic blackmail by the oil producers. Similarly, we have not paid wide attention to other possible non-military crises: in population, food, the total environment, and especially the impact of all these world problems upon each other. We have often written about the widening gap between the rich industrial nations and the majority of mankind, but we have not explored all its economic, political, and even military implications. Will the backward countries

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producing scarce commodities imitate the Arabs and with what effect upon American interests? How soon will shortages of fertilizer and rainfall bring more devastating famines than are already apparent in Africa or in the worsening shortage of food in India, and what will be the consequences for the U.S.?

4. Some of our analysts have been following these and other problems, often with admirable advances in our understanding. But the Agency as a whole has not come to grips with the wider definition of national security implicit in the greater demand for economic and sociological intelligence. We did not concentrate on the problems of the sea, for example--decline in the world's fisheries, offshore searches for petroleum and other minerals, conflicting territorial claims, control of pollution, and many other issues emerging over the years--until we became involved in a crash program to support American preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas.

5. One strong signal that we ought to rearrange our priorities was the recent speech of Secretary Kissinger before a special session of the United Nations. His six-point program reads like a new directive to CIA: we must pool and refocus our considerable expertise and develop the skills and the ideas to deal with a wider range of phenomena, indeed with a wider view of international relations. The kinds of problems of which Kissinger spoke cannot be satisfactorily studied in the old isolated country-by-country manner, nor can they be neatly categorized as political, economic, or military. The intelligence process, as we see it, is becoming steadily more interdisciplinary and global.

6. Thus the role of the individual analyst is already changing and will change more. An analyst now must handle more complex matter than ever before, use new tools, explore relationships between his subject and others, and participate in broad studies that go beyond his own individual competence. With the development of the new NIO system he will also have to learn more about writing estimates than most analysts have needed to know in the past.

7. We think of the Agency analyst as not unlike the modern medical practictioner. Unless the medical practictioner keeps abreast of new methods of diagnosis and treatment, he fails his patients and lays himself open to charges of malpractice. Intelligence organizations are a special and easy

prey to such charges, and they are not always without merit. We also think of the Agency's educational effort as much like that of a large modern university. This university goes beyond courses which teach skills to undergraduates and pass on the lore of the past; it has graduate seminars to explore problems of the present and future, and it has institutes and centers of study to widen the horizons of knowledge and to maintain contact with those outside the university concerned with the same problems.

8. Even with the analogy to the university in mind, much of what we propose below can be carried out by the Office of Training in its present size and structure. It is important, however, that the whole Agency look for ways of redirecting its objectives, methods, and output toward the world of the future, and this task of course transcends the function of any one office. The task begins with questioning our traditional assumptions about what we do and how we do it. It includes recognizing that some skills can be taught and some cannot, and that there is no one right way to do our jobs. It looks for ways of helping every analyst at every level to put his or her brains, perceptiveness, objectivity, and ingenuity to best use.

9. Our general program rests on three propositions: (a) that some new or unfamiliar techniques can be passed on to individuals in the intelligence business at nearly every level; (b) that well-qualified and successful analysts can be exposed to other subjects which might help them to do their jobs even better, and (c) that there are still other subjects on which thoughtful and qualified people can make a creative contribution if provided with the incentive, opportunity, and freedom to do so in a group intellectual environment, Much of the training now going on in OTR, in individual offices, and on the job does, of course, follow these precepts. We here are making them explicit and applying them in particular to the question of training for analysis in the more demanding future.

10. Basic Skills. To begin at the undergraduate level, we propose some revision, some continuation, and some extension of the existing course structure for teaching basic skills. There would be six courses for analysts, the detailed discussion and rationale of which are included at Tab A. These would be:

a. A Survey of Intelligence Collection and Processing (for Career Trainees and new analysts),

b. Estimative Exercises (for Career Trainees and new analysts),

c. Writing Intelligence Estimates,

d. Writing Better Reports,

e. Oral Briefing Techniques, and

f. Use of Graphics.

Of this group the third and the last would be new courses. The others would be revised approaches to existing courses.

11. Mind-expanding Programs. The Office of Training has demonstrated the high value of the mind-expanding programs it already gives: the Mid-Career Course, the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, and the Senior Seminar. The newer course in Systems Dynamics is finding a small but enthusiastic and appreciative clientele. All four show promise of continuing to improve. We feel the time is ripe to extend the mind-expanding effort for analysts (and for some people who do not work in those directorates which are labeled as analytic, but who nevertheless do analysis), by providing some more extensive exposure to more particular analytic subjects. Here we propose continuing development and perhaps expansion of methodology training in the individual offices and directorates, along the lines pioneered by the Office of Economic Research. We also propose a general course on Survey of Analytic Methods to include both new and old methodologies but with emphasis on the new.

12. We think also that there should be a seminar on Intelligence and National Policy. It would deal with the impact of each on the other, examine definitions of national security, the role of intelligence in general, perhaps the place of CIA in American society, the nature of intelligence targets (including the extent to which entities other than national states should be targets), the assumptions underlying intelligence activities, programs, and analyses, and other subjects to be developed. Unlike the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, which touches some of these problems in their past

and current aspect, it would focus on the comprehensive effort to define intelligence work for the future. These programs are discussed further at Tab B.

13. Advanced Seminars. We believe there should be some floating seminars at a high level which should be considered not as "training" but as an integral part of an Agency effort to prepare itself better for present and future tasks. Their value has already been shown by the recent Agency-wide seminar on the Law of the Sea organized and conducted by OBGI and by the continuing seminar on Latin America conducted by OTR. The seminars could operate in a manner similar to that of the study groups at the Council on Foreign Relations. There would be a chairman (not from the Office of Training), a rapporteur (an able senior official seconded temporarily to OTR), and members invited by name. The subjects would be determined by the Deputy Directors upon recommendation by an ad hoc committee, and should range widely over substantive problems as well as intelligence objectives and methods. The results might be recommendations for changes in the emphasis or method of collection and research, or reports on substantive problems of major significance. Such a plan would take care not to duplicate existing committees or task forces; the focus would be on exploring new subjects. A further discussion of seminars is included at Tab C.

14. Our approach also requires a new look at the functions of the Office of Training. Collecting and analyzing data, deciding what is relevant, and presenting the results in a meaningful way are intellectual arts which are more often learned than taught. But the Office of Training can help to organize and manage this all-Agency effort in a way that transcends the old aim of offering useful but discrete courses by its own staff. Many senior officers have for years demonstrated their willingness to help OTR by occasional lectures and panel discussions, but our ambition is to engage the whole Agency in a broader educational effort. We see the Office of Training as an important help in organizing the Agency's redirection at the working level; not leading the pack, but working with the directorates in bringing the right people together to educate themselves and one another. We see OTR, not primarily as a bureaucracy offering rigidly compartmentalized approaches to isolated concerns of operations, production, and management, but as a resource to aid in revitalizing the intelligence process. With advice and support from the top, an expanded and

innovative educational program can play a major part in helping the Agency as a whole to mobilize its many talents for an effective governmental role.

15. To this end we suggest several structural changes:

a. We believe that the Office of Training should be renamed the Intelligence Institute. The term "training" tends to connote low-level elementary classroom drill. While there are certain skills related to clandestine operations which need to be taught and practiced, along with certain other skills of management and even analysis which can be improved by drill and exercise, the educational and intellectual responsibilities which OTR exercises are indeed much broader than that and will become still more comprehensive in the future. As our specific recommendations suggest, we view the Agency's internal educational function as extending to a variety of mind expanding and exploratory activities. We believe that a change of name would signify that the so-called training function had moved into a new role and assumed a new dignity within the intelligence community.

b. We suggest also that, while the educational function is a "service" and therefore a part of the Directorate of Management and Services, it is a service which can only be effectively carried out by the regular flow into and out of the new Institute of highly qualified personnel from other Directorates. Most of the staff of the Institute should be made up of officers whose career is in other directorates and would remain so. There should be few officers in the Institute who are career educators. It should be made easier, therefore, for highly qualified people to move in and out of the educational effort for both long and short tours. The Institute, for example, should be able to borrow people for as little as three weeks and frequently for periods such as six months or a year, and they should have the right of return to their former or equivalent positions.

c. We believe the new Institute should regard itself as assuming greater responsibility for new intellectual directions not only within the Agency, but also within the Community. We think this is inevitable as budgetary funds are restricted for the intelligence

community as a whole. We do not suggest that the Agency's educational function should aim to replace that of the other agencies, but rather that it should seek to adapt its programs to their needs as well. This could have two benefits; it could over time move toward the established goal of CIA's providing a "service of common concern", and it could improve the intelligence product itself.

d. We suggest that, within the new Institute, an effort be made to separate the academic functions from the bureaucratic and to place each under separate management. Managerial functions necessarily preempt a great deal of the time and effort of the top officers - such as supervision of budgeting, personnel, registration, security, buildings and facilities, selection boards, committee meetings, etc. - and detract from the time and effort available for their unique and central function, namely, curriculum development, supervision of instruction, development of special and new programs, and - above all - just plain thought about where to go and what ought to be done. We believe, as a start, that a qualified academic dean ought to be appointed to concentrate attention on the academic functions.

e. Finally, we believe that, as a means of carrying out its responsibility for breaking new ground and for better systematizing knowledge of the intelligence business, the new Institute should establish small Centers for the study of particular functions. For example, a center for the development of analytical methodology ought to exist within the Institute, because of its Agency-wide applications, rather than within the Directorate of Science and Technology. There might be a center for the development of intelligence doctrine, a center for the development of presentational methods, a center for academic contacts and research, especially with respect to analytical method. The term "center" is used advisedly since it is meant to be inter-disciplinary and interfunctional, and to provide facilities (space, support, T/O slots), contact and exchange points, and encouragement for such activities, rather than to claim exclusive performance or jurisdiction for itself. Each center would be guided by an advisory committee made up of Agency and non-Agency personnel.

16. We recognize that our proposals will take time to carry out. They will not work unless the Agency as a whole becomes engaged. OTR will have to persuade Agency management of their validity, and Agency management will have to overcome resistance to change and encourage a more positive attitude within the analytic directorates toward the training function. It takes months of hard work to plan every hour of a new course, with trial and error in successive runnings, so that no seminar or skills training can ever be considered exactly right, especially in times of rapid change. We therefore ask that our recommendations be regarded as a set of initial proposals which will have modest beginnings, be modified as they achieve momentum, and which will produce an increasingly improved product as they are implemented.



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TAB A: SKILLS

Individual Courses

1. Survey of Intelligence Collection and Processing. This would be a refurbishing of the Intelligence Production Course, which we think is somewhat too long and too comprehensive. We believe the course should be a genuine survey, an orientation, and should not try to give the final word on intelligence objectives or on methods of analysis. It should survey who collects what and how, and who gets it. It should survey the ways in which collected material is stored and recovered. It should describe the functions of the analytic offices and provide demonstrations of research and reporting in process. Particular products should be available for reading, their readership should be identified, and the uses to which the reports are put should be discussed. This might require some additional time with some of the production offices. In all the above, the production and use of intelligence in the Department of State, the military services, and other government agencies should continue to be covered. The course should be given to all Career Trainees early in their training, before their second interim assignment, and should be open to new analysts early in their employment.

2. New methodologies should be covered, but somewhat more briefly than at present, and some attention should be devoted to the older ones, i.e., the documentary, impressionistic, and content-analysis approaches. Both types should concentrate on specific present and prospective Agency applications, with outstanding examples. The discussion should be treated as illustrative and not definitive. The course might properly end with seminars on the objectives of intelligence and discussions of the relative value of the different means of collection, uses of various methodologies, and usefulness of the various types of intelligence production.

3. Estimative Exercises. This course would be a refurbishing of the existing Intelligence Writing Techniques Course. The present course is an intensive one-week exercise for Career Trainees simulating three DDI research and production offices and aimed at producing a single coordinated report on the situation in a given country. While we believe this provides

a valuable learning experience for prospective analysts in working with real data and working with each other, it seems to be less realistic with respect to the types of reports actually written by those offices, despite the earnest and skillful efforts of the instructor. We suggest that a somewhat longer, less intensive period with two exercises, rather than one, might prove more helpful. The first exercise might involve the preparation of separate studies: e.g., an OSR-type estimate of the capabilities of the military in Country X to do a particular job or operation, an OCI- or OPR-type estimate of the likelihood of a change of government or the extent of disaffection and its impact in the same country, and an OER-type estimate of prospects for increasing exports by that country or its likely future balance-of-payments position. These might be prepared with the supervision of analysts seconded for a week from appropriate DDI offices. The second exercise might involve the posing of a particular foreign-policy problem and the preparation of a short estimate to which each of the simulated office groups would contribute and on which the group as a whole would render a coordinated judgment. The subject might be, for example, the consequences of US termination of economic (and/or military) aid, or the probable policy of Country X in the event of war between its Neighbors Y and Z, etc. This exercise, too, might be carried out with the help of analysts seconded for a week from analytic offices.

4. Writing Intelligence Estimates. Since the change effected in 1973 in the responsibility for the initial preparation of draft NIEs, draft estimates are written in a wide variety of analytic offices in the Agency and outside it. At the same time, the character of the NIE is changing and is subject to change in the future. The course would be taught by those experienced in drafting estimates and would include both discussion and exercises. It would be urged upon CIA personnel most frequently assigned drafting responsibility, but would be open to those who aspire to draft estimates as well as to those outside the Agency who are assigned drafting responsibility.

5. Oral Briefing Techniques. The course on effective public speaking now given occasionally by an outside contractor ought to be advertised and developed by the conversion of particular Agency reports into oral briefings with slides, etc. It is our belief that many Agency products, including National Intelligence Estimates, do not receive adequate understanding or produce sufficient impact because the written word, or the

length of the document, or the distribution system (including security controls) inhibits comprehension and/or attention. We suggest that the Agency adopt a more active program of oral intelligence briefings to make its product and its judgments better known to consumers. It is often bureaucratically easier to gain attention by scheduling an oral briefing than by sending the document along, even with a cover note from the DCI. Moreover, in some cases, the report or estimate is summarized and briefed by recipients for their superiors; it would be preferable, in the interest of accuracy if no other, for the producers to do this themselves. We suggest that OTR take the lead in encouraging the wider use of briefings and that it provide services and demonstrations to those production offices which show an interest.

6. Use of Graphics. This would be a new course aimed at the production offices and the NIOs and designed to demonstrate and develop ways in which designs, tables, graphs, and maps can be used to reduce the volume of words in the intelligence product and enhance its impact. It would be a companion course to Oral Briefing and would use some of the same techniques. It would be aimed at a somewhat larger audience than the other, but its object would be the same, to achieve a wider and quicker comprehension of the intelligence product by not intimidating the reader with a ponderous, wordy document.

7. Writing Better Reports. This would be the Intelligence Writing Workshop under a new title. The change would be designed to attract the right students as the present title does not--namely, those who have the required technical or professional capacity for their work and who know correct English, but who need help in learning how to prepare a cogent, well-organized report. A further study of the precise way in which this course is taught might produce some specific suggestions to improve it; we have not yet made that effort. We also suggest that the title of the remedial writing course be changed from "Effective Writing" to "English Usage" or a similar title, so that students are not sent to that course when they belong in this one.

TAB B: MIND-EXPANDING COURSES AND SEMINARS

Survey of Analytic Methods

1. The main purpose of this survey would be to enlighten and explain rather than to prepare for large-scale and widespread application. The underlying theory is that many analysts have learned to apply a few methods to their problems, have heard about some of the newer methods but have little real knowledge of them, and have little or no conviction that other methods of approach might assist them. Moreover, many analysts are consumers of other analysts' work; hence, even if a particular analyst is bound to one or another methodology because of his particular responsibilities, we think it would be helpful to him in evaluating someone else's work to understand how he proceeded.

2. The survey course we have in mind would be intended for analysts over a wide range of age, grade, and experience. For some it would be an introduction, and these people might wish to follow up on their own or in a more detailed course provided by an Agency component or a university. For others, the course might simply be an eye-opener and inspire them to apply a different technique to a problem at hand; an insoluble problem might become soluble. An understanding of the possibilities inherent in a new approach might stimulate new requirements for information, and such requirements might prove easier and cheaper to fill. For some, exposure to a particular methodology might provoke a request to OTR for help in applying it to an analyst's problem; for such cases, OTR ought to have sufficient time and staff flexibility to provide assistance (or tutoring) in application.

3. We think that a survey course ought to be a true survey; that is, it ought to cover the traditional methods (e.g., use of documentation, content analysis, and gross quantity statistics) as well as new ones. It might even provide some useful insights on how to read reports from the State Department, the Defense Attaches, or the Agency. But we suggest that the main portion of the effort would be devoted to newer methods with special attention to the ways in which these could be applied by the analysts taking the course. Many of the newer techniques have been developed by engineers and mathematicians, and their application to industrial

production is more clearly apparent than to political or military-strategic problems. It would be the task of those responsible for the course to select those methods for explanation and demonstration which would be most applicable to the tasks of intelligence analysts.

4. In addition to the traditional methods already noted, our preliminary judgment would be that all or most of the following would be covered:

a. Public opinion and sampling techniques,

b. Games,

c. Gaming,

d. Measurement of integration and disintegration,

e. Correlation and regression,

f. Systems dynamics,

g. Probability, including the Bayes Theorem,

h. Queueing and linear programming,

i. Input-output and communication as applied to decision-making.

5. The task of developing a specific course plan should probably be shared by analysts, methodologists, and instructors. Such a method of preparation would help to assure that the methods covered and the way in which they are discussed will be adapted to real problems of analysts rather than confined to preferences of methodologists or instructors.

Seminar on Intelligence and National Policy

6. Implicit in intelligence work during most of CIA's existence have been certain assumptions--written and unwritten--which ought to be examined by both those newly engaged in it and those who have been with it far longer. Among these assumptions are:

a. The ultimate purpose of intelligence is to avoid war, or, if it comes, to be able to prevail.

b. Intelligence is concerned largely with power, particularly military power and to a lesser extent economic power (and economic power largely because of its input to military power).

c. The principal targets of intelligence are other states, or groups within other states which control or aim to control or influence those states' behavior.

7. It is true of course that we have come to adduce other targets and other subjects in recent years. The Agency and the Community have begun to concern themselves more with economic matters, especially availability of resources, and with various kinds of economic disequilibria. We have in effect widened our definition of "national security." The fact is that the intelligence officer, whether collector or producer, is always working on some definition of national security--implicit or explicit--and some presumption of what his job is. These often are defined in directives solemnly enacted at a high level. But these directives may be more epiphenomenal than forethoughtful. They may be a distillation or codification of the present rather than a perspective of the future. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer, often manifested through the imagination and resourcefulness of the individual, to detect, define, and measure threats to national security and to evaluate consequences and options in national security policy.

8. The object of the seminar which we propose would be to examine the assumptions underlying our work, to test them, to examine others, to think the unthinkable about them. It would be to examine definitions of national security and to consider the range of threats to national security. It would consider whether "national security policy," which we serve, is foreign and military policy or other policies as well. The course would not answer such questions, but raise them for thought and discussion. The presumption would be that analysts (and by indirection collectors and managers as well) would be able to think more broadly and objectively about their tasks, would be more imaginative about definitions of national security and about threats to it, and would produce intelligence with greater impact upon policy and contribute more effectively toward the formulation of national policy in the next quarter-century.

9. We suggest that the following topics might be covered in the seminar:

a. International relations theory: the conceptual framework for the study and comprehension of international politics; traditionalist and behaviorist approaches.

b. Fallacies and hazards in intelligence analysis: group-think, myths, assumptions, methodological exclusiveness.

c. Power, war and peace, political stability and instability as targets of intelligence activity.

d. Non-traditional targets of intelligence activity: technology other than military, the quality of populations, cultural characteristics, religions and ideologies as affecting national behavior, transnational corporations, professional associations, the physical environment, the world's resources.

e. Threats to national security: importance and relevancy of military power, economic power, political instability, ecological imbalances, weather changes, demographic trends, economic disequilibria, various revolutionary movements, cultural change, shortage of resources.

f. Means in international relations; identification and evaluation in terms of applicability and effect; uses in particular situations of military action, economic pressure, propaganda, diplomacy, trade and aid, subversion and paramilitary action, investment and development, domestic policy, etc.

g. The role of intelligence: within the government; in relation to Congress and the public; as a research organization, alarm-sounder, policy advocate, policy executor.

TAB C: ADVANCED SEMINARS

1. Perhaps the most important part of our suggested program for analysts' development is the Advanced Seminar program. The first two parts -- one dealing with basic skills and the other designed to expand the horizon and stir the imagination of analysts -- point toward doing present tasks more effectively. The Advanced Seminars would be oriented toward broader tasks and innovative approaches. They would look to the identification and resolution of intelligence problems which are with us but not resolved or which appear likely to arise in the future.

2. We think of these Seminars as of two types, those largely substantive and those largely methodological--though no sharp line can be drawn between them. Those of a substantive character would be selected on the criterion that they are topics which might not be in current demand but could soon become so, or that they would assist long-term policy planning. The object would be to engage thought, research, and collection before demand became pressing, with the ultimate objective of having a core of people qualified to deal with the question, either in response to later demand or by forwarding a report (through the NIO structure) as an early-warning contribution to policy-making. Topics for substantive study and exploration might vary widely, but would always be related to some real problem of intelligence analysis with a clear implication for policy-making. A few topics which come to mind are: the training and outlook of Soviet leadership and policy-makers twenty years hence; pressure groups and bureaucratic politics in the USSR; impact of Communist participation in Western European governments; weather changes and their impact upon population pressures and resources.

3. On the methodological side, we would hope that Advanced Seminars could engage with some of the more difficult analytic problems which intelligence officers have had to confront, such as the role properly accorded to judgment and intuition in making intelligence estimates, the question of how to deal with intangibles (such as morale and cultural characteristics) in assessing national power or predicting national policy, how can the policy-making

process be studied in the USSR and China, the reasons why "unexpected" events have occurred which have rendered traditional wisdom erroneous, etc.

4. Our proposal for the establishment of an advanced seminar program is similar to a proposal for a Research and Discussion Group Program recently put forward by the Director of Training and approved by the Management Committee. Our proposal was, however, independently developed, and we might have somewhat different thoughts concerning topics which should be given priority. We are also reluctant to make a sharp distinction between research and discussion, as the OTR program appears to do. We think research should arise out of discussion, or vice versa, as development of a subject might dictate. In any event, we consider that the proposal already approved is essentially a sound approach and a correct one and suggest that our proposals be considered in connection with its implementation.

5. We believe that the success and future of an Advanced Seminar program are heavily dependent upon the importance and relevance of the topics chosen and upon the quality of the personnel who participate. We strongly urge, therefore, that the leadership of the Advanced Seminar program work closely with the analytic directorates in selecting both topics and participants and take all necessary steps to assure that the product of the Seminar will have a clearly discernible utility in improving the ultimate intelligence products.

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4 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : University Study of Intelligence

1. The first point to recognize in considering university study of intelligence as a subject (or any studies of the intelligence process or of intelligence as a profession) is that intelligence is a "craft" (as Allen Dulles called it), an art, or a practice. It is not a discipline in the same sense as physics or chemistry. One can study what happens in intelligence work, how it happens, why it happens; one can discuss what ought to be in terms of morals, practical politics, or efficiency. But there are no objective natural laws, no single discipline, no professional mystique.

2. This not to say that the subject should be ignored by scholars, writers, thinkers, and students. As in medical practice or construction engineering, many disciplines are drawn upon, much experience has been accumulated, needs have led to practices, programs have been developed, and results and dangers need to be assessed. It is said of medical practice that a point was reached about 50 years ago when practicioners of medicine were for the first time doing more good than harm. The same might be said of intelligence practictioners - though probably with a date within the last decade. Now is probably a good time, therefore, to sum up and to evaluate what has been going on.

3. A book is needed, and an authoritative one. To use the academic terminology, it should be a book on the "theory" of intelligence, and it should cover both "descriptive theory" and "normative theory", that is, it should be a generalized report on intelligence systems in operation today and an evaluation of their value, uses, effectiveness, and proper place. Examples and detailed descriptions should be used to give life to the "theory" and not to "expose" secrets.

4. It is in some ways easier to say what such a book would not be than to say what it would be. Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence is still the best theoretical work in the field, but is confined to an American approach, to a part of the intelligence process, and to a fairly narrow definition of intelligence subject-matter. It says less about some things and more about others than a comprehensive theory of intelligence should. Harry Ransom's books are scholarly, but not

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theoretical; they are largely research reports on the U.S. intelligence system. Lyman Kirkpatrick's books fluctuate between personal experiences and exposés on the one hand to defensive analysis of U.S. intelligence achievements on the other. He has not hit the right note yet. Allen Dulles's Craft of Intelligence does a great deal to illuminate techniques and the arts, but it is so interlarded with personal reminiscences and stories that it cannot be called a serious theoretical book so much as a good source book. Then there are the exposés, written by those outside or formerly on the inside, intended as money-making ventures pursued out of vindictiveness or sensationalism and written with minimal regard to standards of truth or balance.

5. To be authoritative, a theoretical book on intelligence should be written by some one who knows what the intelligence process really is and who has sufficient access regarding U.S. Soviet, British, and other systems that his generalizations are accurate. Unfortunately, that means in practice that it should be written by some one who is on the inside or has been on the inside and is trusted by those still there. That means that he may not be trusted by those on the outside who will read, study, and evaluate the book. Whatever he writes, he will be attacked by some as an apologist or mouthpiece.

6. The best way to minimize adverse criticism and to gain scholarly acceptance is for the book to be absolutely cold-blooded and apolitical in its descriptive theory; that is, it must not be defensive about the American intelligence system or its achievements and failures, and it must not be anti-Soviet or anti-Communist in its tone when discussing or referring to the Soviet system. In its normative theory it will be aiming at a largely American audience, but it will need to be just as critical of American intelligence organization, methods, operations, and personnel as of any other. The writer would need to be free to critize or challenge the whole American system or any part of it.

7. What I have laid out is a big order, and not one that the Agency might be willing (or wise) to place. I, for one, am not at all certain that I would like to undertake such an effort. It would be a time-consuming and strenuous effort without any assurance that the final hassle with the protectors and defenders of the system would not result in destroying it.

8. The alternative of doing it entirely outside the system without any Agency assistance or access does not appeal to me very much either. It would be harder work, result in a less good book, and not eliminate a hassle in the last analysis anyway.

9. In sum, a good book on the theory of intelligence is needed, not only as a possible text for university study of intelligence but to improve the general public's knowledge and understanding. On the other hand, producing a book which would meet the standard of being a good book would be a difficult thing to do given the constraints under which both the Agency and the writer would operate.

10. There is still one other possible way to deal with the aim of "going public" in the universities without crossing a broad and fateful Rubicon. This would be to draw up a list of topics and speakers from among active employees and retirees (but, in my view, principally retirees since they would be under less restraint and probably more acceptable) who could and would conduct seminars or give lectures at universities. The subject matter could range rather widely and cover both substantive matters (the world situation, revolutionary movements in Latin America, the evolution of the Soviet system, developments in the Communist world, etc.) and the intelligence system (the supervision and control of intelligence organizations, definitions of national security, secrecy and security, etc.). It would be important that the persons chosen would be sophisticated, open, academically acceptable, and prepared to be critics of U.S. practice and policy rather than knee-jerk defenders.

11. A pilot program might be tried with a few people and a few subjects. It might be initiated, after the people and subjects are chosen, by a letter from the Director to a few universities or university centers for international studies. The letter would declare the Director's interest in lifting the veil from intelligence and in making more of the intelligence product and its people available to the academic community. It would state that certain former employees, at his request, had agreed to make themselves available, that they would be free to express their views in the same manner as any academic personnel (classroom lectures and seminar discussions always were privileged communications off the record), and that speakers and participants would be bound only from the disclosure of sensitive sources and methods. In conclusion, he would want to make clear that his interest was in neither defending nor promoting CIA interests, but in widening the understanding of intelligence and making better known its people and its product.

12. Such a program might, if it got off the ground, gradually build up a corpus of papers, doctrines, and persons gradually moving into the public domain which could later be codified into a collection and made available openly or selectively to centers of study in international affairs. But its success would depend upon how it was managed and how well it was done.

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